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Abstract 
 China is considered to be the world’s second-largest economic power, and in recent years 
has set a precedent for fast economic growth. In addition to this rapid economic growth, China 
has seriously increased foreign direct investment all over the world, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This paper will examine the progression of the relationship between China and Tanzania, 
specifically by delving into the complicated issues of resource governance and how these issues 
relate to the growing presence of Chinese construction conglomerates. It is currently estimated 
that only 6.7% of Tanzania’s roadways are paved, making Tanzania a great candidate for 
infrastructural investments (Hopcraft). The Chinese government has aided Tanzania through FDI 
and has sent state-owned contracting enterprises to help with construction. This new economic 
partnership promises growth and development on both sides, however, dissecting and 
understanding the specific motivations behind China’s involvement can be complex. Ultimately, 
this partnership brings a lot of positive opportunities to both China and Tanzania, but there are 
reasons for Tanzania to remain skeptical.  
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Introduction 
 Development studies and development theory have traditionally taken a westernized 
approach. Aid agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
have dominated the developing world’s cause towards economic development. However, these 
institutions have proven themselves to be somewhat controversial at times by pushing neoliberal 
policies that do not take into consideration the differences that exist between different countries. 
More specifically, there is little consideration for the different challenges faced in developing 
countries. Additionally, the aid that comes from these agencies typically arrives in the form of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which are conditional loan programs that typically 
encourage the borrowing governments to reduce spending in order to receive the loan (Kurian). 
This usually materializes in the form of cutting social programs to refocus on debt repayment. In 
addition to the restructuring of government spending, a lot of these loans are conditional, based 
on a country’s political situation. According to Shiza and Kariwo, “neoliberal policies are 
employed by the World Bank and IMF to manage their political and economic interests over 
economically weak nations perceived to be in international debt crisis” (Shiza and Kariwo). 
Complications with these traditional programs have led developing countries to begin to seek aid 
elsewhere, this is where China steps in.  
The BRIC countries in Africa 
 South-south cooperation is a development strategy that centers on the idea that 
“developing countries” help other “developing countries”. This concept is built on a foundation 
of assumed solidarity that exists in between what have historically been considered “developing 
countries” and the drive for global economic growth. The BRIC countries, which include Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China- have all been considered key players in this movement, and have 
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helped stimulate south-south cooperation. Especially for the cases of Brazil, India, and China, 
the term south-south cooperation has been used to characterize the growing foreign direct 
investment flowing from these countries into the African continent. The variety of different aid 
programs that now exists between these groups accounts for 10 percent of the total aid the 
African continent receives (McMichael). Aside from their investment in Africa, these BRIC 
countries have gained global recognition as growing economic powers over the years and now 
contribute more than 50 percent to recent world economic growth (McMichael). This paper will 
explore the growing relationship of the BRIC countries and Africa by closely examining the 
specific economic connections between China and Tanzania.  
China as an Investor 
 Especially within the last two decades, China has proven itself of extreme economic 
capabilities. After the United States, China is considered to be the world’s second-largest 
economic power, surpassing Japan in 2010 (McMichael). In these recent years of growth, 
Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa has dramatically increased. The World Bank reports, 
“China is one of Tanzania’s biggest trading partners and an increasingly important source of 
development finance and FDI. In 2014 the total value of Sino-Tanzanian trade surged to about 
US$2.6 billion, up from negligible levels in 2000” and additionally, “the value of China’s 
development finance to Tanzania has also grown substantially in recent years, including US$1.2 
billion in 2013/14-2014/15 for the construction of the gas pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es 
Salaam” (World Bank Group). As an economic power, China is constantly looking for resources 
and markets to trade and expand to. Sub-Saharan Africa, and in this case Tanzania, provides a 
relatively untapped market of resources and trading partners that can be seen as an area for 
expansion and growth. 
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Tanzania  
 Tanzania is a country in east Africa, located next to the Indian Ocean, giving the country 
a strategic location in terms of global trade. It is known for its rich biodiversity and is home to 
multiple world-renowned national parks. In 1997, the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) was 
established to facilitate and encourage foreign and domestic investment partnerships. The 
Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) has been largely successful in doing just that. In the past ten 
years, they have “registered 7,159 investment projects worth over 154 billion US dollars, with 
the potential of creating close to a million jobs” (AllAfrica). As mentioned previously, the TIC 
has worked to promote partnerships with both foreign and domestic actors and between 2005 and 
December 2014, projects owned by Tanzanian investors made up 49 percent of the total 
registered projects through the organization. The top three foreign partners that have invested 
through the TIC are the United Kingdom, the United States, and then China with US$3.3 billion 
invested into this organization (AllAfrica).  
 It is difficult to get an accurate gage of the exact amounts and locations of all of the 
untapped reserves of natural resources in the African continent. Pair this with the fact that it is an 
incredibly competitive market; it is no wonder that there are such tense controversies and issues 
that surround the natural resource trade. The rest of the world, especially the countries with 
quickly growing economies, is constantly scrambling to secure guaranteed supplies of natural 
resources and commodities to fuel this growth. The global need for energy sources and minerals 
has driven many different strategic alliances throughout history. According to Kaplinsky and 
Morris, these are some of the driving factors that can help explain the nature and growth of 
modern Chinese FDI into sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, the investments that are channeled 
into building infrastructure and transportation routes. This paper argues that the recent increase 
Flores 6 
in Chinese actors building strategic roadways in Tanzania is driven by the need to get mineral 
and energy resources out of the country and into China.  
History of Chinese Involvement in Tanzania  
 The country we consider to be modern-day Tanzania was born in a divided world; in the 
late 1950s and 1960s when many sub-Saharan African countries began to gain independence, the 
western world was preoccupied with the socialist Soviet Union and the Cold War. In such 
divided times, newly independent African countries were looking to build relationships with 
fresh partners to move on from the colonial relationships they once had. It was during this time 
that China and Tanzania began to cultivate a relationship. In the name of solidarity against the 
larger imperialist powers, China provided sympathetic support to the cause for Tanzanian 
national independence (Chau). Before Tanzania existed as one country, there existed two 
separate colonies, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. In 1964, the island of Zanzibar staged a revolution, 
which according to Chau, “Journalist Lawrence Fellows later observed, ‘China’s big initial 
success in Africa was in helping to stage a revolution in Zanzibar in 1964’” (Chau). On January 
17th in 1964, the Chinese government officially recognized the new revolutionary government of 
the People’s Republic of Zanzibar (Chau). The mainland of what is modern-day Tanzania, 
Tanganyika, at this point in time was still under British rule. Quickly after Zanzibar gained 
independence, there was a revolution in Tanganyika as well. During this time, China offered 
various forms of aid to Tanganyikan soldiers, “China offered to replace British arms with 
Chinese weapons free of charge, including tanks, mortars, rockets, and other weapons” (Chau). 
This aid during the post-colonial transition resulted in a newly formed bond between the two 
countries. On April 26, 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form 
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one country, Tanzania. From this point forward, financial aid to be put towards infrastructural 
development projects began to flow from China to the newly independent country:  
The New York Times reported in 1964 that China had extended a total of $42 million in 
credits and grants to the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar for that year. In 
October of that year the New York Times reported that Beijing created two new 
departments in the foreign affairs ministry to handle relations with Africa. Chinese aid 
was directed to Tanzania as a whole as well as to Zanzibar specifically. (Chau) 
China began to fund various projects in Tanzania. Among these projects were two-high powered 
transmitters, a state-operated farm, and a fully integrated textile mill outside Dar es Salaam 
(Chau). From this point forward, other projects began to develop and new actors stepped in.  
 The first post-colonial Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere and the Zambian president, 
Kenneth Kaunda, had the hopes of building a railway together in order to connect the Zambian 
copper belt with the port of Dar es Salaam, giving them access to a route towards the Indian 
Ocean (Monson). China had been present in the African continent in various locations during the 
post-colonial transition, supporting the new and emerging socialist governments. While the 
socialist Tanzanian government struggled to find the financial support of Western lending 
organizations, like the World Bank, for this new railway project, China willingly stepped in by 
providing the funds and the labor to complete the project (van Dijk). This was the first project in 
which China and Tanzania worked together on such an incredibly large scale. After the 
completion of the TAZARA railway project, Chinese presence in Tanzania has only grown 
deeper:  
In 1975, China had more programs in Africa than did the United States. The culminating 
point was reached in 1976, with the completion of the railway link between Zambia and 
Tanzania to transport Zambian copper to Dar Es Salaam. The building of this very large-
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scale project employed 15,000 Chinese workers and it has made China one of the main 
donors to Africa. At the time, China’s aid to Africa was larger than its trade with Africa 
(van Dijk).  
For post-colonial Zambia and Tanzania, the TAZARA railway represented so much more than 
infrastructural development. It was nicknamed the “Freedom Railway” since it was the first 
successful large-scale development project completed after colonial rule. For China, the 
TAZARA railway project allowed them to be recognized on an international stage, something 
that China had hoped to do, “China’s investment in African development assistance was part of a 
drive to be acknowledged as a world power” (Monson). Map one below depicts the course of the 
TAZARA railway project. As seen in the map, the railway crosses the Zambia-Tanzania border 
and ends at the port of Dar es Salaam. Accompanying the TAZARA railway is the Tanzam 
highway, a project that had been funded by the United States (Monson).  
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Map One: The TAZARA Railway in Tanzania (Monson) 
 
  After the post-colonial transition and the TAZARA railway project, different types of 
Chinese involvement, investment, and interest developed in sub-Saharan Africa. Different actors 
began to emerge and work on varying scales. According to Kaplinsky and Morris, these new 
waves of involvement occurred in different stages after the post-colonial transition. The nature of 
these different waves of involvement can be explained and compared in Table one below.  
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Table One: Size, Sector, and Ownership of Chinese investors in SSA 
throughout the different waves of Chinese involvement  
(adapted from Figure 1 in Kaplinsky and Morris)  
Different Waves of 
Involvement 
Dominating Actors Size Activities 
First Wave Central government 
SOEs 
Large Predominantly 
resources and 
infrastructure services 
Second Wave Provincial 
government SOEs 
Large-Medium N/A 
Third Wave  Sector incorporated in 
China 
Medium Manufacturing, 
wholesale and 
services 
Fourth Wave Private sector 
incorporated in SSA 
only 
Small Petty manufacturing 
and retail 
 
In the mid-1990s, the majority of Chinese actors entering sub-Saharan Africa were large state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The rise of these SOEs in sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to 
China’s growing need for resources and their growing trade partnership with Africa. At this point 
in time, the majority of Chinese-aid-funded projects in sub-Saharan Africa focused on building 
infrastructure and public buildings. These SOEs served as investors and contractors to these 
projects (Kaplinsky and Morris). The latest and most current wave of Chinese involvement in 
Africa showcases the entrance of more private sector enterprises. In certain cases, these private 
enterprises are owned by Chinese citizens who had originally come to Africa working for one of 
the SOEs but stayed to become autonomous entrepreneurs (Kaplinsky and Morris). Table one is 
meant to illustrate the diversity of China’s economic engagement in sub-Saharan Africa 
throughout the years. Ultimately, at this point in time, in the interest of examining resource 
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extraction and export, it is the investment in Tanzania’s roadways that are of particular 
importance.  
Tanzania’s Roadways 
 The construction and maintenance of working infrastructure, especially roadways, is a 
crucial component of driving a country’s cause towards economic development. Infrastructure 
and transportation networks not only facilitate the movement of people and goods, but work as 
networks to connect marketplaces and places of commerce. For a natural resource-rich country 
like Tanzania, well-established roadways and ports are crucial in order to fully capitalize on 
these resources and transform them into profitable commodities. According to the Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic report by the World Bank, not only is Tanzanian infrastructure 
considered below-average compared to other sub-Saharan countries, but they also would require 
US$2.9 billion investment in their infrastructure to compare to other “more developed” nations 
(Hopcraft).  It is currently estimated that Tanzania has 103,706km of roadways and only 6.7% of 
them are paved, meaning the overwhelming majority of them are not (Hopcraft). TANROADS, 
the Tanzania National Road Agency, illustrated this point in Map two to represent the network of 
trunk roads in Tanzania. The agency classifies roadways into two separate categories, trunk 
roads and regional roads. Trunk roads are larger, and connect major towns or serve a larger 
purpose. Regional roads are smaller in comparison.  
Map Two: Tanzania’s Trunk Roads Network (TANROADS) 
* Map two is located in Appendix one at the end of this document 
In Map two, the paved roads are represented with thick black lines, while unpaved roads are 
depicted in red. The majority of the unpaved trunk roads are in the northeast and western half of 
the country. One thing to note is the northeastern-most, large, unpaved road; this route runs 
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through Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro National Park, two areas famous for their 
biodiversity and wildlife migration patterns. The paving of this roadway has been a topic of 
controversy recently and will be discussed further in a later section. To the southwest, another 
section of unpaved roadway is worth noting. The red line that flows from Njombe to Lake 
Nyasa, the lake that shares its borders with Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique is where the 
strategic Liganga region is located. The Liganga region is known for its mines that contain 
minerals such as iron, vanadium, and titanium (Sutton and Olomi).  
 According to Hopcraft, “simulations suggest that improved infrastructure and roads 
would increase Tanzania’s per capita growth rate by as much as 3.4%iv”, but it is not only the 
Tanzanian economy that would benefit from these changes. Tanzania has the potential to become 
a major hub of commerce for all of East Africa. Tanzania shares its borders with eight other East 
African countries: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. Of these eight countries, five of them are completely 
landlocked. Tanzania’s access to the Indian Ocean and its coastal industrial city Dar es Salaam 
are not only critical to Tanzanian economic development but also for many of the surrounding 
countries (Hopcraft). For this reason in particular, Tanzania is an attractive investment for many 
financial institutions and global enterprises.  
Who is funding these projects? 
 Tanzania’s strategic location means that many different groups would see economic 
benefits from a well-established transportation network there. The breakdown of investors in 
these construction projects shows what other actors seek to benefit from these new roadways: 
Of the 52 current road construction projects in Tanzania, 18 are funded by the 
Government of Tanzania, 15 are financed by multilateral aid, 5 are financed by bilateral 
aid, 8 by the World Bank, and 6 are funded by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 
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Chinese companies account for 72% of the awarded construction contracts, 9% of the 
road construction companies are from the East African Community, 11% are European, 
and the remaining 8% are companies from South Africa, South Korea, and Japan 
(Hopcraft). 
For a better understanding of these statistics, multilateral aid refers to aid provided by multiple 
countries, or a group of countries in the form of an organization/institution, such as the World 
Bank or the African Development Bank. Bilateral aid refers to aid flowing from one country to 
another. Referenced above, The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a bilateral and 
independent United States foreign aid agency. According to this data, the Government of 
Tanzania and multilateral aid currently fund the majority of current road construction projects in 
Tanzania, however it is important to understand the rest of the construction process and dissect 
the sources of the funds behind these investors.  
The African Development Bank (AfD) Group is an institution founded in 1964 and 
compromised of three different constituent institutions that work towards the sustainable 
economic development in its regional member countries by “mobilizing and allocating resources 
for investment in regional member countries and providing policy advice and technical 
assistance to support development efforts” (African Development Bank). The African 
Development Bank (AfD) is the Group’s parent organization and has 78 different member 
countries. Of these member countries, 53 are African countries, called regional members. The 
remaining 25 countries are non-African countries; both China and the United States are 
considered non-regional members of the AfD and are big investors (African Development Bank). 
According to the African Development Bank Group: 
At the end of 2012, Chinese investments in Africa totaled US $20 billion. With an initial 
contribution of US $14.59 million to the AfDB, China has taken part in eight 
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replenishments of the ADF and pledged a total contribution of US $486 million, US $122 
million of which was for the ADF XI (2008-2010). China contributed US 
$125,815,361.67 to ADF-XII, which corresponds to a 5 per cent increase from its ADF-
XI contribution. Its burden share represents 2.052 per cent of ADF-XII (African 
Development Bank).  
 
*ADF-XI and ADF-XII refers to different periods of investment within the African 
Development Fund  
China invests heavily in the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund, one 
of the three constituent institutions within the Group. The current and ongoing projects the 
African Development Bank funds in Tanzania focus on multiple areas of development, such as 
transport support, transit infrastructure, sustainable water and sanitation delivery, urban water 
supply and sanitation, skills development for labor market, road sector support, and energy 
support. The ongoing projects that specifically focus on infrastructure include: the Transport 
Sector Support Program, and the Road Sector Support Projects, broken into two phases. These 
projects funded by the African Development Fund are all implemented by TANROADS, the 
Tanzania National Roads Agency (African Development Bank).  
Lastly, it would be impossible to talk about Chinese FDI without mentioning the China 
Development Bank, specifically, the China-Africa Development Fund.  The China Development 
Bank is a state-owned lending bank that funds various development projects throughout the 
world. The China-Africa Development Fund is one of their subsidiary projects, created in 2006 
at the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation Summit in Beijing (Harare Beijing Lovemore 
Chikova). Since its beginning, the China-Africa Development Fund has taken to various 
newspapers announcing certain projects and pledging billions of USD towards these different 
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projects. However, finding a full list of all of their specific development projects and progress 
has proven to be nearly impossible in comparison to the data available on other lending 
organizations. Although the specificity is lacking, there is evidence that this fund, since its 
creation, has generated billions of dollars for investment. To start the fund, the China 
Development Bank itself invested US$1 billion back in 2006. By 2015 they had reached a total 
of US$5 billion for investment. President Xi Jinping then proposed US$5 billion more at the 
Focac summit in South Africa that same year (Poon and Back).  China is willing and prepared to 
invest billions more in the African continent through the China-Africa Development Fund, 
according to AllAfrica, an African news source that seeks to share information about the African 
countries throughout the African continent, “the fund has forked out almost $3.5 billion on 87 
projects in 30 African countries, including Zimbabwe. When all the projects become fully 
operational, Chinese firms would have invested almost $16 billion in such joint ventures.” The 
fact that the China-Africa Development Bank is willing to invest in Zimbabwe is somewhat 
significant. Zimbabwe has a complicated history, much of the world has declared the President 
Robert Mugabe as an unfit and corrupt ruler, guilty of human rights violations and considered a 
dictator and the country’s only president since the beginning. Many other multilateral 
organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, have not been willing to fund projects in 
Zimbabwe because of Mugabe’s reputation (Shiza and Kariwo). However, the China-Africa 
Development Fund has been willing to invest.  The future of the China-Africa Development 
Fund could mean big things in terms of investment and construction for the future of 
development and wealth in the African continent.  
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Who is constructing these roads? 
 Aside from foreign direct investment flowing from China to Tanzania in terms of 
financial aid, it is also important to note that Chinese companies account for 72% of the awarded 
construction contracts (Hopcraft). These contracts typically rise out of agreements between 
Chinese contracting firms, that are typically state-owned, and the Tanzania National Roads 
Agency (TANROADS), an Executive Agency under the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communications. In these cases where Chinese companies are awarded construction contracts, it 
is the Tanzanian government hiring Chinese firms to come into the country and help build 
roadways and other pieces of infrastructure. One of the many examples of this type of 
contracting occurred in December of 2013, when the TANROADS Chief Executive Officer 
signed contracts worth over US$150 million to pay for Tanzanian roadways constructed by three 
Chinese firms. These firms involved in this specific project were the China Henan International 
Cooperation Company Limited (CHICO), the China Railway Seventh Group Company Limited 
(CRSG), and the Sichuan Road and Bridge (Group) Cooperation Limited (AllAfrica). In the case 
of this contract, the roadways being built in Tanzania will form part of a larger trunk route 
between Egypt and South Africa, thereby linking the northern part of the African continent with 
its southern-most country. The table below, Table two, can be used to further illustrate the role of 
Chinese contracting companies in Tanzanian road-building projects. This table shows the ten 
largest (in length (km)) completed roadwork projects in Tanzania, funded by the Government of 
Tanzania, since the year 2000. Of the ten largest projects included in Table two, eight of them 
had Chinese contractors; firms from Japan and Kuwait contracted the other two projects.  
Table Two: LIST OF COMPLETED UPGRADING/REHABILITATION 
ROAD PROJECTS SINCE 2000 UNDER TANROADS (PROJECTS 
FINANCED BY GOV. OF TANZANIA) (TANROADS) 
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Project Name (Names of 
connecting cities/towns/villages) 
Length 
(km) 
Signing 
Date 
Contract Sum 
(TSh in 
billions) 
Contractor 
KIGOMA-LUSAHUNGA (BALANCE 
WORKS) 
154 Jun 18 
2009 
 
191.454 
 
CHICO-CRSG 
JV 
 
ISAKA-USHIROMBO 132 
 
Aug 18 
2009 
145.44 CHICO 
DODOMA-MANYONI 127 
 
Jan 4 2003 63.888 
 
KONOIKE 
 
KYAMYORWA-BUZIRAYOMBO 120 
 
Apr 1 
2005 
49.125 
 
CHINA GEO-
ENG.  
BUZIRAYOMBO-GEITA 100 
 
Feb 10 
2005 
41.14 
 
SINOHYDRO 
 
MBWEMKURU-MINGOYO 95 
 
Feb 24 
2003 
51.488 
 
MA KHARAFI 
NANGURUKURU-MBWEMKURU 95 
 
Feb 14 
2003 
39.239 
 
CICO 
 
MANYONI-ITIGI-CHAYA 89.3 
 
July 30 
2010 
109.643 
 
SINOHYDRO 
 
NYANGUGE-MUSOMA 
(MWANZA/MARA BORDER-
MUSOMA SECTION) 
85.5 July 30 
2010 
85.369 CHICO 
 
MWIGUMBI-MASWA-BARIADI-
LAMADI (Bariadi-Lamadi) 
71.8 Sept 9 
2009 
67.409 CCCC 
*1 Tanzanian Shilling=0.00045 US Dollars.  
 As shown in Table two, these contracts are worth large sums of money and span long 
distances. The projects are named after the two points being connected by the construction 
project, in some cases these are cities, other times the names represent small villages, making it 
difficult to find a map that shows images of what exactly these roads look like. However, some 
of the locations on the table above are significant in terms of resource extraction, specifically for 
gold mining. For example, the Geita district that is home to the Geita open-pit mine owned by a 
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South-African based mining company is a point of connection for one of the road projects listed 
in Table two (Stucchi et. al.).  
 The Chinese contracting companies that are represented in this graph are all state-owned 
enterprises: CHICO, CRSG (the first project is a CHICO-CRSG joint venture), China Geo-
Engineering Corporation, Sinohydro, China Chongqing International Construction Corporation 
(CICO), and the China Communications Construction Co., Ltd. (CCCC). CHICO, the first 
group, is a state-owned enterprise that contracts international engineering projects and provides a 
number of other services, including mining development and according to their website, 
“undertaking infrastructural projects aided financially by Chinese Government in oversea 
countries” (China Henan International Cooperation Group). It is important to highlight that the 
Government of Tanzania funds all of the projects listed in Table two, however there are other 
projects that have gone to Chinese contractors that are funded by multilateral organizations, such 
as the African Development Bank. Table two helps illustrate the point that contracts worth 
extremely high amounts of money are being awarded to Chinese contracting firms. This remains 
true for other construction projects funded by other means. According to TANROADS, of the 
nineteen completed projects between 2000 and 2015 that were financed by multilateral aid 
organizations, thirteen were contracted to Chinese construction companies. Of these projects 
contracted to Chinese contractors, seven were funded by a combination of the African 
Development Bank, the Government of Tanzania, and in two cases, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). The International Development Association, part of the World 
Bank Group, financed the remaining six projects (TANROADS). This information listed in 
Table two also helps illustrate the various roles of Chinese actors in road-building projects in 
Tanzania. Chinese actors stand on both sides of construction, through funding multilateral 
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organizations and by working as contractors via these state-owned enterprises. According to 
Sutton and Olomi in their book An Enterprise Map of Tanzania, contracting has become a 
foreign-dominated ordeal:  
Contracting is dominated by foreign firms. While only 3% of contractors are foreign, they 
execute 60% of all works by value. Chinese contractors, who entered the scene only 15 
years ago, dominate the market. They now constitute 26% of all foreign contractors in 
terms of numbers….Chinese contractors are usually backed by Chinese financial 
institutions and suppliers. Non-Chinese contractors have sometimes employed Chinese 
foremen to inculcate Chinese culture and methods into their operations. Some Chinese 
employees in Chinese construction firms have partnered with locals to establish firms 
with majority local ownership, which allows them to gain preferential treatment in 
tendering (Sutton and Olomi).   
The quick and recent growth of Chinese contractors is what makes this relationship particularly 
interesting. There is overwhelming evidence that demonstrates that the progress of these 
partnerships exists and that Chinese actors have contributed plenty of financial and labor 
resources to aid Tanzania in their development efforts, especially for the case of road building 
and increasing the country’s available efficient infrastructure. Tanzania has a lot to gain from 
these improvements and developments in their own infrastructure, in terms of development and 
facilitating economic trade between cities. However, this still presents us with the question, what 
does China stand to gain from this relationship? 
The Demand for Minerals: Tanzania’s natural resources 
 Tanzania, like many of its regional neighbors, is rich in a variety of natural resources. In 
terms of domestic wealth, historically, mining and quarrying have contributed relatively little to 
the country’s GDP in comparison to wealth generated by other sectors, such as farming and 
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agriculture (Hassan and Mungatana). However, historically speaking, mining and quarrying have 
in fact played an important role in Tanzania’s total export earnings. As the case is in many 
countries with a colonial legacy, foreign resource extraction can present itself to be somewhat of 
an issue and in some cases can hinder economic development. Sutton and Olomi explain in An 
Enterprise Map of Tanzania, that:  
The 2009 Survey of Industrial Establishments by the National Bureau of Statistics 
identified 38 enterprises that deal with metals and fabricated metal products; ten of these 
enterprises were foreign owned and nine others were jointly owned with foreign firms 
(Sutton and Olomi).  
Statistics such as these lead one to question the ethics of resource governance and wealth. The 
Revenue Watch Institute is an organization that works to promote transparency and responsible 
management of natural resource revenues by publishing a resource governance index. This index 
rates resource-rich countries based on the fairness and reputation of their extraction practices. In 
the year 2013, Tanzania ranked 27th out of the 58 countries considered by the Revenue Watch 
Institute. This weak overall ranking was based on a variety of criteria set by the Institute, this 
includes, “insufficient reporting requirements and the lack of a freedom of information law,”; 
“failure to publish mining contracts and a lack of data on the state-owned mining company”; and 
lastly, “low scores in government effectiveness and the rule of law. It scores poorly on 
corruption and accountability indicators” (Revenue Watch Institute). The lack of transparency 
and the presence of corruption in resource management make it difficult to understand exactly 
how many resource reserves in Tanzania are currently being commoditized and what actors play 
a role in this commodification.   
 The gold industry is a particularly complicated case when it comes to resource 
governance within Tanzania. In 2012, gold became Tanzania’s main export, “gold, which 
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contributed virtually nothing to exports 20 years ago, is now Tanzania’s main export, accounting 
for 36% of export revenue in 2011.” (Sutton and Olomi). With this gold boom, came an increase 
of wealth, but not necessarily where one would expect to see:  
In 2000/2001, prior to the growth in minerals income, 36 per cent of Tanzanians were 
considered poor; this number fell slightly to 34 per cent over the following seven years. 
In particular, the rural majority of Tanzania’s population (where the country’s gold mines 
are located) was most affected by the failure to reduce poverty, with 18.4 per cent of the 
rural population suffering food poverty and 37.6 per cent of rural Tanzanians unable to 
meet their basic needs. This contrasts with 7.4 per cent and 16.4 per cent, respectively in 
the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam (Elbra).  
These numbers indicate that although Tanzania had begun to export and capitalize on their gold 
reserves, the people living in the rural communities that contain these gold mines did not see 
much in terms of reduction of poverty levels. These communities also are probably the most 
likely to be affected by this new industry in terms of loss of land, or change in their environment.  
 In order to combat the issue of foreign enterprises poaching Tanzania’s mineral wealth, 
on March 3rd, 2017, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals of the Government of Tanzania issued 
a press release to declare a newly placed export ban of metallic mineral concentrates and ore 
(Ministry of Energy and Minerals). This press release explains that, “export of mineral 
concentrates and ores for metallic minerals such as gold, copper, nickel and silver has been 
banned with effect from 2nd March, 2017. The ban intends to make sure that mineral value 
addition activities are carried out within Tanzania….Mineral value addition activities will 
provide employment opportunities, revenues and technology transfer, hence more benefits to the 
nation” (Ministry of Energy and Minerals). Mineral value addition activities would include any 
type of processing, smelting, or refining of the metal in order to increase its value. This ban 
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makes it so that these activities are restricted within Tanzanian borders. However, this new order 
does not restrict the export of already processed, smelted, or refined metals. It is important to 
note that although there is the intention to perform these value addition activities domestically, 
the country currently does not have the infrastructure or equipment with this ability or capacity. 
This implies that heavy investment will need to take place in this industry in order for Tanzania 
to perform these activities domestically and prepare the goods for export.  
 This new order also does not include other metals and mineral resources such as iron, 
vanadium, titanium, lead, tin, zinc, petroleum, natural gas, or coal, which are also big 
commodities that are exported out of Tanzania.  
China’s Demand 
 The current global thought, from a western perspective, tends to associate high 
development with high consumption. In order to source the western-idealized lifestyle and 
growth taking place all over the globe, high amounts of natural resources are needed to maintain 
this idea of wealth. The global demand for minerals and new sources of energy increased around 
2008-2009 (Kaplinsky and Morris). According to Kaplinsky and Morris, “the current boom is 
fuelled by a massive augmentation of demand in the very large Asian Driver economies” 
(Kaplinsky and Morris). As these “very large Asian Driver economies” grow, the global demand 
for commodities such as energy, minerals, and food crops also grows. During the time between 
2000 and 2007, trade between China and Africa dramatically increased from US$10 billion to 
US$70 billion, this was also a significant time for growth in China (van Dijk). The African 
continent has historically always been sought out as a supplier of natural resources since colonial 
times. The dynamic between the imperial powers and the African colonies set a certain dynamic 
for resource extraction and has a legacy that can still be seen today in some cases. In terms of 
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energy commodities, it is the amount of unallocated reserves rather than the amount of reserves 
they have that makes the continent’s shares so strategically important (Sutton and Olomi). In 
December 2016, The Australian Financial Review reported that in November of that same year, 
“China imported 92 million tons of iron ore, up 11 percent from the previous month” (Australian 
Financial Review). The demand for mineral resources in China exists, just as it does in many 
places of the world. An additional key factor here is that there is also the need to build positive, 
diplomatic trading relationships in order to gain access to unallocated reserves.  
 Industries that Chinese actors have taken particular interest in when it comes to Tanzania 
include the iron, steel, and coal industries:  
The government of Tanzania recently signed a US$3 billion coal and steel mining 
agreement with the Chinese mining conglomerate Sichuan Hongda Group that will offer a 
major opportunity in the generation of coal-fired electricity. This agreement could also 
lead to the development of a sizeable iron and steel industry in Tanzania (Sutton and 
Olomi).  
Agreements like the one mentioned above are commonly found throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 
There are other cases where Chinese corporations make deals with the government of Tanzania, 
bringing in equipment and infrastructure to expand an industry, and then profit off of this 
partnership. Another example is the case of Tanzania Steel Pipes Limited, a Chinese-owned 
company that imports machinery to manufacture steel pipes, and then exports the finished 
product to Tanzania’s neighbors (Sutton and Olomi).  
Tanzania’s Supply 
 The variety of metals and minerals specific to Tanzania include precious metals, non-
metallic colored stones, base metals and mineral fuels, and a range of industrial rocks and 
minerals (Hassan and Mungatana).  
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 When discussing Map two in a previous section, one of the unpaved roads mentioned ran 
through the Liganga area, which, “studies by the National Development Corporation indicate that 
the Liganga area is rich in minerals containing iron, vanadium and titanium. Reserves are 
estimated to be between 200 and 1,200 million mt, with reserves of 45 million mt already proven 
through drilling” (Sutton and Olomi). Liganga serves as an excellent example of a relatively 
untapped market for mining resources in Tanzania.  
Who benefits? 
 These investments in infrastructure, specifically road building, have a wide range of 
benefits. However, since China and Tanzania’s relationship dates so far back, both countries 
have made gains through a number of different ways. When discussing the benefits coming out 
of these investments, it is equally as important to discuss how these benefits are distributed and 
among whom. Additionally, aside from the profits from the natural resource trade and 
construction business, it is critical to see all benefits of this partnership from another perspective. 
Looking past the strict financial gains, there are other reasons and theorized motivations behind 
China’s investments and Tanzania’s acceptance.  
Trade deals and contracts: who is getting paid? 
 In earlier sections, there were many examples of actual projects that had been carried out 
in Tanzania using Chinese contractors, funded by multilateral aid organizations or the 
government of Tanzania itself. Table two listed ten projects funded by the government of 
Tanzania but it is important to discuss the progress of payments. Back in 2012, the government 
had still remained indebted to a lot of these foreign contractors and consultants: 
Non-payment and late payments occur in both government and private-sector contracts. 
The government recently admitted that contractors and consultants, both local and 
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foreign, are owed a total of US$300 million in outstanding payments on public contracts 
(Sutton and Olomi).  
Aside from outstanding payments, there seems to be other ethical issues that poorly affect 
these types of investments. According to Transparency International, each year roughly 
US$28.6 million, about 10% of the money spent on construction-related activities, is lost 
to corruption (Sutton and Olomi). Although unclear where exactly this money ends up, it 
is daunting to think that the officials responsible for handling these large sums of money, 
allocated for specific projects, are instead headed towards the pocket of an individual. 
Knowing that corruption occurs and affects 10% of the construction-related money, gives 
the sensation that at least some of the officials involved probably do not have the public’s 
best interest at heart when pushing forward with these projects or at least have other 
selfish motivations. Looking back on history, China played a role in Tanzanian politics, 
just as the country itself was emerging. According to van Dijk, there are countries where 
China is building up political credit and intends to become more active” (van Dijk). This 
quote had referenced both Ethiopia and Tanzania. Although there is not much more 
discussion of what exactly this “political credit” would mean, it is important to 
understand that there is an aspect of this relationship that is politically charged.  
Employment Opportunities 
 A curious component of these business relations relates to the matter of employment 
opportunity. There is a strong and well-established Chinese workforce in the African continent, 
but the size and success varies from country to country. Along with the quick increase in Chinese 
FDI towards the African continent, a quick increase in trade and migration also followed. There 
are estimates that placed the number of Chinese workers in Africa back in 2007 to be around 
750,000 people. That was ten years ago, and now numbers put them around a million (Mohan et. 
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al.). However, in places such as Tanzania, Chinese companies have a historical presence, and 
therefore are more likely to understand and employ local Tanzanians (van Dijk). Estimates in 
2011 placed roughly 10,000 Chinese workers in Tanzania (Mohan et. al.). An increased Chinese 
presence in the African continent has also affected certain societies that are now learning how to 
incorporate Chinese neighbors into Tanzanian civil society. In many cases there is general 
approval, however, in certain cases, this can become a point of tension between locals and 
foreign workers. For example, many of the Chinese state-owned enterprises that bring in staff 
from China build accommodations such as living compounds near or next to the construction site 
they are working on (Mohan et. al.). Not only is this sometimes perceived as favoritism, but it 
also segregates communities, separating the locals from the Chinese workers who come in and 
work on these projects.  
 Tanzania and China have a mix of state-owned and privately owned firms and companies 
working in the mining and construction industries, which has led to a whole other set of 
problems. In some cases, the Chinese mining and construction companies will bring in their own 
team of people from China as opposed to hiring locals. The number of actors working in these 
sectors and the differences between them can lead to confusion:  
President John Magufuli came out strongly to clarify why the government decided to 
freeze new employment opportunities in the public service, saying the move is aimed at 
stamping out phantom workers in the government’s payroll…. ‘There have been 
instances where a mining company operates in the country for 10 years but its officials 
are telling you that they don’t make any profit….if that is the case, they better go back to 
their countries,’ he stated….. ‘I understand that there are 2,800 guest workers, who were 
paid pensions through NMB Bank amounting to 7tn shillings (US$3.24 billion)’, said Dr. 
Flores 27 
Magufuli, directing officials to ensure the money was recovered (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports).  
*NMB stands for the National Microfinance Bank of Tanzania  
The case described above, illustrates the potential problems that can arise from having a 
lack of transparency within these foreign firms. Here, “guest workers” refer to foreign 
workers, as in non-Tanzanian people. These guest workers were receiving pensions 
through the National Microfinance Bank of Tanzania, which are intended to benefit local 
workers.  
 In addition to an increased number of Chinese migrants coming to work in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the government and the private sector have facilitated Chinese migration to the continent 
through various means. For example, according to Mohan et. al., “in Lujiazhuang in Dingzhou 
city, Hebei province, 70 percent of the village labor force works abroad and 90 percent of those 
workers headed for Africa ten years ago.” In 2011, these workers sent remittances back to China 
worth around 50 million RMB, which translates into just over US$7 million (Mohan et. al.). This 
translates into a lot of wealth leaving the African economies. Mohan also states that “there has 
been a significant deregulation of labor recruitment and a growth in private labor contractors in 
populous provinces such as Sichuan, Hubei and Henan”; Henan province is the owner of 
CHICO, one of the Chinese state-owned contracting companies listed in Table two. The Chinese 
government has facilitated the movement of workers to sub-Saharan Africa by establishing 
specialized-economic zones in different parts of the continent and by providing government-run 
websites that offer resources to make the move and transition easier. Although Chinese FDI 
presents itself as a great economic opportunity for Tanzania, on a smaller scale, when speaking 
in terms of the individual employee, it cannot necessarily be considered as a guaranteed or 
sustainable job opportunity.  
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The Question of Sustainability 
 From a certain perspective, Chinese FDI and economic partnerships with sub-Saharan 
Africa can appear to be a situation in which everyone leaves a winner. China can expand into 
new markets, and the country being invested in now has all of these new projects being built to 
promote development. However, many consider the question of sustainability: exactly how 
sustainable is the dynamic of this economic relationship? In other words, at what point in 
Tanzania going to be able to stand on its own feet. One critique of this relationship, is the 
concern of neocolonialism. Although Tanzania has gained a lot from Chinese investments, they 
have also lost in other areas. There seems to be a certain level of dependency maintained when 
discussing Chinese FDI in Tanzania, aside from the constant loans, Tanzania’s markets have 
seen a growing dependence on the Chinese markets, “while the increased economic ties have 
resulted in increased economic growth, they have also increased Tanzania’s vulnerability to 
downturns in China’s business cycles” (World Bank Group). It is natural for a country’s 
economy to take a hit if one of their largest trading partners is in an economic downturn, 
however, when two economies are so incredibly intertwined, it especially increases this risk. 
Another issue for economic sustainability presents itself through the need of equipment in order 
to process or refine goods. For example: 
Scrap metal has already become valuable in Tanzania for exports, and the hope is that 
people will recover plastic in the future. Currently most of the plastic export bottles are 
compressed and exported to China! Hence, it is important that there will be a plastic 
recycling plant in Tanzania soon (van Dijk).  
The recycling of these materials has already turned into a profitable industry, however, 
the value addition activities that transform these waste products into commodities occurs 
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mostly outside of Tanzania. This is simply another example of how China’s actions can 
be perceived as ways the country is taking advantage of Tanzania’s position.  
 Aside from the sustainability of this business partnership itself, Chinese FDI in 
Tanzania presents issues of sustainability for local economies, land ownership, and 
ecological well-being.  
Local Economies 
 Although this expanding partnership that has been developing between Tanzania and 
China for decades has brought a lot of growth and development to both countries, it has also had 
some negative impacts on small-scale local economies within Tanzania. As the case is for many 
local craftsmen and entrepreneurs, it is difficult to compete with Chinese products, “countries 
like Tanzania find it difficult to compete in an international or global context, while their markets 
are flooded with cheap Chinese products” (van Dijk). Cheap products coming in from China may 
make some everyday items more affordable, but it does reduce the chances of local producers 
being able to compete with these cheap prices. In addition to importing cheap goods from China, 
locals now compete with Chinese businesses, owned by entrepreneurs that have migrated to sub-
Saharan Africa and have set up shop. Along with the growing number of Chinese migrants, 
Chinatowns have sprung up in some of the big cities:  
Dar es Salaam is the commercial center of Tanzania, one of the hubs of transportation for 
the East Africa coast since AD 1000, as well as the largest city. Kariakoo Ward contains a 
large market sprawling over many streets and hosts a concentration of Chinese 
businesses. Chinese traders sell hardware, construction materials, plastic ware, 
kitchenware, curtains, locks, and electronic appliances. Some of them also occupy 
apartment buildings as living quarters. Many shops selling construction materials have 
warehouses outside Kariakoo with customers able to pay for their goods in the Kariakoo 
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ship and collect them from the warehouse. Chinese restaurants can be found all over the 
city, including in the most affluent area, Oysterbay. There are also a number of Chinese 
medicine practitioners in Dar es Salaam. (Mohan et. al.).  
The increase in Chinese small businesses has led to a culture clash in some places in sub-Saharan 
Africa, partially because of the newfound economic competition for native business owners and 
job seekers. More specific to the point of Chinese FDI in terms of infrastructural investments, 
displacement and environmental costs are also concerns for sustainability.  
Who is losing land?  
 All across globe, not just Tanzania, people can be displaced from their homes. There are 
a number of reasons that cause this, but in Tanzania, many of the discussed construction projects 
have caused some type of displacement. The African Development Bank defines these people as 
a Project Affected Person (PAP), “one who, as a consequence of the project, sustains losses as a 
result of impact on a) land, b) structure, c) immovable asset and/or d) livelihood/incomes 
(African Development Bank). The African Development Bank also wrote up a resettlement 
action plan for one of the large-scale projects they are funding in Tanzania that runs from 
Dodoma, the Tanzanian capital, to Babati. The end product would run 260 km. This particular 
report and action plan written by the African Development Bank discusses how they plan to 
minimize impacts, the number of affected households, the social impacts of relocation, and the 
socio economic profile of the affected people. Since this is such a large-scale multilateral 
organization, there is some accountability that comes attached to their reputation and their name. 
However, it has proven to be nearly impossible to find something of this depth for any Chinese-
backed project.   
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National Parks and Wildlife  
 Mining and construction are two industries with clear environmental impacts. For the 
case of Tanzania, a country known for its national parks and diverse wildlife, these 
environmental impacts could have serious consequences. Delving into controversies that attempt 
to compare human development and economic growth with environmental preservation is 
extremely complicated. In 2012, there was a controversy around building a road project titled, 
the Serengeti Road, with the intentions of establishing a well-connected road system in 
northeastern Tanzania to connect Lake Victoria with the port of Dar es Salaam. The Serengeti 
Road would have caused massive losses to Tanzanian economy and ecosystem. Serengeti 
National Park not only is a place of national pride, but brings in extremely high amounts of 
revenue for the nation’s tourism industry: 
The Serengeti Route would bisect the migration and cut the ecosystem in half. In addition 
to transiting through the core range of a threatened population of black rhino and the 
endangered wild dog, this route would fracture the migratory path of the wildebeest and 
zebra…. Evidence suggests that the knock-on effects of a degraded ecosystem in terms of 
reduced tourism could reduce foreign revenue, which could alter the national exchange 
rate and ripple through the rest of Tanzania’s economy (Hopcraft).  
After much discussion, it was decided to leave this particular route running through the 
national parks unpaved. Although there was no loss of the Serengeti Great Migration 
pattern, this particular case demonstrates the need for policy and legislature to protect 
these environmental assets.  
Findings and Discussion 
 China’s role in Tanzanian infrastructural investment is a lot more profound and takes 
many more forms than simply Chinese FDI. There is a strong presence of state-owned 
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contractors, specifically engaging in the actual building, construction, and engineering of these 
roads. There exists an established community of Chinese migrants who work for a lot of these 
state-owned contractors or who have remained in Tanzania to become entrepreneurs or small 
business owners. In terms of expanding to other markets and gaining access to new and 
unallocated mineral resource reserves, this dynamic clearly brings a lot of economic benefits to 
the Chinese economy. Aside from the clear benefits associated with expanding to new markets, 
Chinese firms have been able to build professional connections in Tanzania. These professional 
connections have allowed Chinese actors to expand into other industries aside from development 
and construction. 
 In terms of Tanzania’s own development, their partnership with China has brought many 
great benefits as well. A solid transportation network, especially routes that bring commodities 
out towards economic centers to turn a profit, is crucial to development. Without China’s help, 
Tanzania would not be on its path to becoming one of the most important economic hubs in east 
Africa. However, it is important to consider what this FDI means in terms of long-term 
development goals for Tanzania. For example, Tanzania still lacks much of the machinery and 
equipment to execute large-scale construction projects in comparison to China. The same goes 
for machinery and equipment to perform value-addition activities. As discussed earlier, Tanzania 
exports much of its scrap metal and recyclable plastics to China in order for them to be recycled 
and sold (van Dijk). If this process were to take place within Tanzania, the country would 
increase their profits on this export. The government of Tanzania is already taking steps to 
ensure that these value-addition activities take place within domestic borders for the cases of 
metallic commodities, such as gold. However, they still must acquire the equipment and skilled 
workforce to carry out these economic activities in order to begin to see profits. This leaves us 
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wondering if Tanzania has become too dependent on Chinese FDI to be able to reach their full 
economic potential on their own.  
 In terms of the motivations behind Chinese road building, based on the Tanzanian supply 
and the Chinese demand, it is clear that Tanzania possesses minerals that China both needs and 
wants for the sake of their own development. When investigating the motivations behind these 
relationships, the overall issue of transparency on both ends has made it difficult to establish 
truly clear connections. Ultimately, there needs to be more research done and disclosed to fully 
understand the economic impact the road building and mining industries have on local 
populations.  
Conclusion  
 In comparison to reliance on traditional neoliberal aid agencies and structural adjustment 
programs, south-south cooperation has given the developing world new opportunities to grow 
and develop without accepting all of the conditionalities set forth by institutions like the World 
Bank and IMF. However, it is unclear if these new relationships can be completely trusted as a 
‘no-strings-attached’ alternative. Responsible resource governance and the importance of a 
healthy distribution of resource wealth is something that remains to be seen in Tanzania. Local 
issues with corruption, the involvement of foreign actors, and the lack of information all seem to 
contribute to this issue. During colonial times, issues of responsible and just resource governance 
plagued the colonies. Although colonial times are over, these same dynamics seem to hold a faint 
legacy. In Tanzania, it may be beneficial to retain a healthy level of skepticism towards Chinese 
actors and involvement to ensure that western imperialism has not been replaced with Chinese 
neoimperialism.  
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